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Lessons from European history for the Communist Party of China? 
Following the leadership transition in Autumn 2012, Politburo Standing Committee 
member Wang Qishan recommended party members to read the book The Old 
Regime and the Revolution by Alexis de Tocqueville.2 Reflecting on the causes of the 
French revolution, Tocqueville argued in his seminal work that a social revolution 
was more likely when living conditions are improving and dissatisfaction with the old 
regime is rising. Chinese academic He Qinglian has argued “[Wang Qishan] meant to 
warn the ruling clique that, according to the Tocqueville Law, reform might not be fun, 
‘the most dangerous time for a bad regime is not when it is most evil, but is when it 
begins to reform’, the so-called ‘reform’ is no different from seeking death”.3 He 
Qinglian further elaborated “from this we could guess that for the next five (or even 
ten) years, China's political direction would be maintaining the status quo, making 
minor repairs here and there, insisting not to go back to the old path (Mao's path) or 
walk down the evil path (democratization).” If He’s analysis is correct, and Wang 
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Qishan was indeed interested in upholding the status quo, he could have also 
recommended cadres to learn more about another European country in the 19th 
century, Otto von Bismarck’s German Empire. Known for his balance-of-power 
Realpolitik, Bismarck unified the country in 1871 and laid the foundation for the 
modern German welfare state. In this paper I will argue that Bismarck’s rule can 
provide a useful historical analogy to discuss China’s socio-political trajectory past, 
present and future. I concur with Roxann Prazniak that “(the) histories of Europe and 
China offer rich opportunities for exploring aspects of the diversity and common 
experience of human history”4 and that “(the) history of Western Europe illuminates 
facets of the historical experience that often remained in the shadows or side 
currents of the Chinese experience. Conversely, Chinese historical patterns have 
often developed possibilities that remained untapped or dormant in the European 
context.”5 
In the first part of this chapter I will compare and contrast key socio-political 
developments in the German Empire under Bismarck (1862-90) with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) during the Mao (1949-1976) and post-Mao period (1976-). I 
argue that there are more similarities than differences between Bismarck’s approach 
to social and political stability in the 19th century and China’s social management 
approach in the late 20th and early 21st century. Both the German Empire and the 
PRC were late-comers to nation-building. In both cases the industrial revolution and 
urbanisation were initiated top-down under authoritarian political leadership. 
Economic modernisation led to societal diversification and the rise of new economic 
and social interest groups seeking political representation.  
Similar to China since the reform and opening up period the German Empire under 
Bismarck was marked by decades of relative political stability and increasing 
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economic prosperity. This stability was the outcome of political rule which can be 
likened to an iron fist in a velvet glove. While Bismarck prosecuted political 
opponents such as the German catholics, the Polish minority in Prussia as well as 
social democrats, he simultaneously also laid the foundation for a modern welfare 
state.  By introducing health insurance, accident insurance, and old age pensions 
Bismarck attempted to limit the revolutionary potential of the German workforce. As 
my discussion will show, Bismarck’s approach to social and political stability failed to 
succeed.   
In the second part of my paper Bismarck’s social legislation will be contrasted with 
the introduction of social policies in the fields of social security, labour, health, 
education and housing in post-Maoist China. Distinguishing between social policy 
and social management, often understood to mean stability preservation (wei wen)6, I 
argue that such efforts have at best led to the establishment of a rudimentary welfare 
state in China. The lack of success of Bismarck’s social legislation suggests that 
social policies limited in scope and ambition may enhance regime stability in the 
short term, but that they are likely to fail in the medium- to long term since they do 
not address deep-seated questions about social, political and economic justice in 
China.  
This chapter thus centers around the question to what extent the Community Party of 
China’s (CPC’s) approach to social management in post-Maoist China can be 
explained with reference to Bismarck’s political statesmanship in the late 19th 
century. If the historical analogy provides illuminating insights and if historical lessons 
can be drawn from the comparison of the political history of two different nations 
during different periods of time, this would be highly significant. Given the uncertainty 
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of mainland China’s political transition7, which has been described by Minxin Pei as 
“trapped”8, the question how China will deal with the social question is relevant not 
only for researchers studying China but also for Chinese decision makers as well as 
the general Chinese public. It is hoped that by “(pausing) to step to the side of one 
historical tradition to examine issues from another historical perspective interrupts 
the construction of a central authoritative narrative”.9 and by “(juxtaposing) the 
cultural spheres of Western Europe and China reveals more about the human 
historical experience than either one alone can offer and opens each to the 
experiences of other historically conditioned situations.”10 
In my conclusion I argue that while Bismarck’s social legislation succeeded in 
temporarily slowing the ascent of Germany’s Social Democratic Party, he ultimately 
failed to contain their rise to power. In terms of the historical lessons from Imperial 
Germany a deepening of social policies in China would not only contribute to 
enhanced social safety nets but also help lay the foundation for state-led 
reconciliation of interests between different parties. As a necessary precondition for 
such a development the CPC would need to gradually open up the political process 
for non-state actors. Such a reform strategy would allow the CPC to continue 
steering China’s transition, albeit with the help of civil society actors and greater 
public participation.  
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Bismarck’s approach Vs China’s social management approach: similarities 
and differences    
In the first part I will compare and contrast key socio-political developments in the 
German Empire under Bismarck (1862-90) with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) during the Mao (1949-1976) and post-Mao period (1976-present). While it 
should not come to anyone’s surprise that a newly industrialising middle European 
country like the German Empire in 19th century differs in many ways from the PRC 
since its foundation in 1949, there are nevertheless remarkable similarities in terms 
of the nature of the political system and the effects it has on societal development in 
both countries. Findings from the comparative historical study will inform my critique 
of the CPC’s social management approach in the second part.   
 
Germany and China as late-comers to nation-building 
One of the most striking similarities between Germany and China is that both are 
late-comers to nation-building. The German Empire came into existence after the 
Prussian victory over France at Sedan in 1871.11 Hans-Peter Ullmann described its 
form of governance as “hegemonial federalism”. Among the 27 constituent territories 
the Kingdom of Prussia played a leading role. The German Empire was ruled by four 
organs, the Emperor and Chancellor, as well as the two bodies of parliament, the 
Reichstag on the national level and the Bundesrat on the federal level. As a 
constitutional monarchy with a strong Prussian-dominated administration, the new 
German nation-state adopted the rule of law and allowed competitive elections 
among political parties.12  
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The German Empire had the features of an authoritarian nation-state, with the 
executive branch of government dominating the legislature. While playing a largely 
symbolic role, the Emperor was also in charge of the military. He authorised the 
Prussian wars against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870–71. 
The Chancellor, on the other hand, played a more significant role in the day-to-day 
domestic administration of the country. As the nominal head of the Bundesrat, the 
Chancellor had to garner support for his national policies in the German Reichstag. 
The Reichstag was initially elected every three years (after 1888 every five years) by 
male Germans above the age of 25. It could establish laws and approve budgets.13       
Fourty-years after the establishment of the German Empire China’s revolution in 
1911 led to foundation of the Republic of China (RoC). The RoC emerged as the 
successor of the Qing Empire in 1912. Experiments with constitutional democracy 
failed in the early years of the Republic.14 The subsequent first half of the 20th 
century was marked by warlordism and civil war between the CPC and the ruling 
Kuomintang (KMT). In 1949 the People’s Republic of China emerged as the 
successor of the RoC. In quick succession the PRC extended its territory and 
incorporated Xinjiang in 1949 and Tibet in 1951, creating a unitary multi-ethnic state 
under leninist party rule, with Mao Zedong as the paramount leader until his death in 
1976.     
According to Frederick Teiwes the Maoist state was a ‘totalistic state’, “one which 
may have fallen short of the idealized totalitarian model, but which nevertheless 
achieved a remarkable degree of penetration of society”.15 The key governing organs 
consisted of a trinity of party, state, and military (dang zheng jun). Representative 
bodies such as the National People’s Congress (NPC) had no independent power 
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and its key functions were communication and propaganda as well as limited interest 
articulation. The second representative body of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) played an important role in creating a united front. 
Its democratic parties were not autonomous nor could they influence national 
policies.16 
In the post-Mao era, the “totalistic functions performed by the Maoist state”17  
changed such as “playing multiple roles normally left to the private sector in many 
countries: employer, saver, investor, manager, economic planner, price setter, social 
provider, and redistributor of social and economic resources”18. According to David 
Shambaugh, “Deng’s program changed the very nature of the state from being a 
proactive agent of social-political change to being a more passive facilitator of 
economic change and reactive arbiter of social-political tensions”.19 China’s political 
system evolved from an autocratic and highly personalised system under Mao to a 
more consensus-based, bureaucratic form of authoritarianism based on Leninist 
party rule.20  
A comparison of the political systems of the German Empire and the PRC reveals 
both similarities and differences. In terms of similarities leaders such as Bismarck, 
Mao or Deng perceived themselves as a political avantgarde with the mission to 
modernise their respective countries. In the case of Imperial Germany political 
leadership under Bismarck has been described as authoritarian.21 In China, 
autocratic rule under Mao turned to a more paternalistic and authoritarian style under 
Deng.22 In terms of differences, national policies in the German Empire were debated 
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publicly and at times subject to electoral outcomes. In the PRC policies have been 
largely confined to internal party deliberations and thus can be considered party 
policies.    
State-led industrialisation in Germany 
In comparison with its European neighbours Britain and France, Germany’s industrial 
revolution started comparatively late. According to Hans Mottek industrialisation 
unfolded from 1834 until 1873. The industrial revolution in Germany differed from 
other European nation-states also in other significant ways. Ralf Dahrendorf 
identified five phenomena that were characteristic for the special development in 
Germany. He points to the role of big-sized banks and their support for major 
companies; state-led top-down industrialisation; state ownership of rails and canals 
as well as key industries such as mining, iron, electricity, gas, water and 
transportation; state socialism in the form of the three insurances for health, accident 
as well as old age and disability; and  finally, Dahrendorf identifies a strong emphasis 
on nationalism as the dominant spirit of the time (Zeitgeist).23  
As a late-comer to industrialisation the German Empire did not have to engage in a 
bottom-up experimentation and could learn from experiences of neighbouring 
countries. It did so, however, in a highly selective way. According to Dahrendorf, the 
German Empire was able to “borrow the achievements of its western neighbours, 
despite the latter being incompatible with its own social and cultural context. It was 
able to appropriate the acquired to meet its own ends, to meet the ends of its 
obsolete institutions.”24  
The combination of modern economic forms and an authoritarian political order led to 
a peculiar form of capitalism in which the state played a dominant role in the 
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economy. While it enabled the German Empire to industrialise “quickly and 
thoroughly”25, the state-led nature of the process also hampered the growth of small 
and medium sized companies, prevented the rise of a broad-based and politically 
conscious bourgeoisie, and undermined the emergence of a citizen society.26 
Industrialisation in China: catching up with the United Kingdom? 
In the case of China, industrialisation started in the first half of the 20th century 
during the Republican period. Industrialisation during the Nanking decade however 
occurred highly unevenly, with the lower Yangtze delta and part of the Wuhan area 
taking a lead. Manchuria under Japanese occupation also industrialised quicker than 
other parts of northern-western China. After the foundation of the PRC first attempts 
by Mao Zedong to catch up with the United Kingdom’s steel production during the 
Great Leap Forward in the 1950s ended in famine.27 Only with the disbanding of the 
people’s communes after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) in the early 1980s 
China embarked successfully and in sustained way in large scale industrialisation. In 
the context of the four modernisations the Communist Party of China prioritised 
agriculture, light industry, national defence and science and technology; de-
collectivised land in order to enhance rural productivity; allowed foreign investment in 
some sectors of the economy; and strengthened China’s higher education system 
with the establishment of eight key universities.28     
Just as the ‘ancient’ regime in the German Empire of the 19th century, Chinese 
decision-makers in the late 20th and early 21st century engaged in instrumental 
learning and selective adaptation. The approach of “utilising western techniques 
whilst maintaining a Chinese core (yi xixue weiyong, yi zhongxue wei ti), first 
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popularised by reformers during the late Qing dynasty (1644-1911), was 
characteristic of China’s embrace of market reforms after 1978. He Qinglian 
identified four key characteristic features of China’s reform process under Deng: a 
continued over-concentration of political, economic, cultural and military might in the 
hands of the Communist Party of China; a privatisation of previously collectively-held 
assets (hua gong wei si); a turn to pragmatism as the only guiding principle; and 
incremental economic reforms without political structural reforms.29       
The comparison of state-led industrialisation in Imperial Germany and the  post-
Maoist period in the PRC reveals some remarkable similarities. In both cases the 
political elites could employ the full weight of the state machinery to promote 
industrialisation from the top down. As late comers, both in Germany and China 
commercial practices were introduced without adjusting the existing political 
institutions to the newly adopted models of capitalism. Finally, the strong emphasis 
on the state as a key developmental actor reduced the space for a more independent 
private sector and civil society. As the following discussion will show, the late but 
state-led industrialisation and urbanisation had a profound influence on societal 
development.   
Social responses to state-led modernisation in imperial Germany 
Industrialisation and urbanisation in the German Empire led to occupational 
differentiation. Whereas in 1871 almost half of the German population were 
employed in agriculture, this percentage dropped to one third at the begin of the first 
World War.30 Industrialisation fundamentally altered family structures, in particularly 
among the working class. Industrial work disciplined the workforce and led to long 
working hours for men, women and children. When industrial accidents happened, 
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workers were often left without compensation and fell back into poverty. Access to 
health and education for workers prior to Bismarck’s social reforms was limited.31 
Economically successful members of the middle class, on the other hand, such as 
wealthy industrialists, bankers, and leading administrators integrated themselves into 
the upper aristocratic class. Dahrendorf argues that the emerging German 
bourgeoisie was characterised by individuals in competition to one another, unable to 
instigate a citizen-led revolution and to make demands for a new political class.32 
A born aristocrat himself, Bismarck relied during his liberal era on the parliamentary 
support of the National Liberal Party (1871-1879), followed by a conservative turn in 
1880, when he started working with the conservatives and a reformed and more 
right-wing National Liberal Party (1880-1890). He was deeply concerned about the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and its ability to garner more and more votes from 
workers in Reichstag elections.33 He also perceived the Polish minority in the eastern 
part of Prussia to be a threat to the unity of the newly unified German Empire. 
Bismarck was also suspicious of German Catholics and their loyalty for the Roman 
church, which he considered a threat to the integrity of the German Empire. 
Historians have explained Bismarck’s approach towards minorities as one of 
‘negative integration’. Hans-Ulrich Wehler described it “a manipulative strategy on 
the part of the Chancellor, designed to safeguard the authoritarian system in an age 
of rapid social and economic change by focusing the attention of ordinary Germans 
on a common enemy, large enough to be credible, but not serious enough to 
threaten the Reich’s political survival”.34 Bismarck repeatedly rallied the public 
against perceived enemies of the empire (Reichsfeinde) to pursue his policy goals. 
Such political maneuvering came at the expense of developing the German 
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monarchic and bureaucratic state into a parliamentary state based on civic and 
liberal premises.35  
Bismarck’s relentless persecution of social democrats in the form of the Anti-Socialist 
Law (1878-1890) only temporarily slowed their ascent. Seligman and McLean argue 
that “what can not be contested is that the Anti-Socialist Law backfired disastrously 
(...). The same sense of unity developed among Socialists as a result of official 
prosecution as had emerged in similar conditions among Catholics and Poles”.36 
During the 1912 Reichstag election the Social Democratic Party emerged as the 
strongest parliamentary group and garnered 110 seats.37 Seligman and McLean 
further conclude that “his strategies of persecuting minorities polarized German 
politics, contributed to the atomization of society in the Reich, and set a dangerous 
precedent of official intolerance which, lamentably, was followed by the governments 
of both Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler”.38 Political conservatism and societal dynamism 
thus characterised state-society relations in the German Empire towards the end of 
the 19th century.  
In the following, I will contrast social responses to state-led modernisation in Imperial 
Germany with social developments in both Maoist China (1949-1976) as well as the 
post-Maoist period (1976-). This distinction is necessary to do justice to the historical 
particularities of the Chinese case. Arguably, there are also important ideological 
differences to consider. Whereas Bismarck fought against the perceived danger of 
socialism, the Chinese leadership after Mao had to reinvent communism after the 
failures of the Great Leap Forward  (1958-1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976). Whereas previous discussions showed more similarities than differences 
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between the two time periods, it can be argued that societal development in China 
followed a different path from the German Empire.  
Social cellularization in Maoist China 
Social stratification in China followed very different trajectories during the Maoist and 
post-Maoist period. Andrew Nathan has pointed out that Maoism  “was highly 
stratified in several ways: by the class status system, by the system of bureaucratic 
ranks, and by the social cleavages between rural and urban residents and between 
state and non-state employees.”39 He maintains that “the system of control 
mechanisms (units, class labels, political campaigns, the party network) added up to 
unique achievement in the social technology of control.”40 Chinese farmers were kept 
in their place and in a significant way tied to the land with the help of the household 
registration system (hukou zhidu), whereas urban Chinese became dependent on 
the work unit (danwei) in the allocation of resources. According to Vivienne Shue 
societal demands had to be channeled through the party-state bureaucracy and 
“articulated in the categories of the state’s own ideology - categories of class struggle 
and revolutionary purity, anti-imperialism and antirevisionism.”41 Shue maintains that 
the “party-state relied on its organs of mass mobilization - the peasant associations, 
labor unions, the women’s federation, the youth league, and so on - to press these 
categories of social analysis and concern into the popular mind.”42 Nathan described 
the Maoist social structure as one which “forced individuals into dependency on party 
secretaries in their work units in order to enforce social conformity.43” 
The economic failure of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) and the political 
violence during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-76) posed an 
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existential threat to the CPC. Teiwes maintains that “Mao Zedong left a difficult 
legacy for the post-Mao state: a fractured and grievance-riddled society, a party-state 
with reduced legitimacy and weakened dominance over society, faction-infested 
institutions, ambiguous official norms and a divided top leadership.”44 Nathan outlines 
the key concerns of Deng thus were to “reform economic institutions so as to 
increase living standards and efficiency; to redress the grievances of individuals who 
had been harmed under Mao; to create a new legitimacy based on economic 
performance rather than a vision of a future utopia; and to institutionalize the Party’s 
own decision making processes to improve the quality of its leadership.”45  
Social stratification and new social cleavages in post-Maoist China 
Societal development during the post-Mao era was a result of top-down economic 
modernisation and bottom-up entrepreneurialism of the Chinese people. As Shue 
outlines “(expanded) markets in commodities, labor, services, money, and 
knowledge have presented people in almost all walks of life with new opportunities to 
provide for their own welfare by working or investing in ventures outside the scope of 
their home units.”46 Economic reforms after 1978 created both winners and losers. 
While rural Chinese briefly benefited from relaxed price controls in the early 1980s, 
their income progressively declined in comparison to urban wages.47 Rising income 
inequalities are just one of social ills that have plagued China since 1978.  
While Shue argues that “thanks to all the splendid opportunities - and to all the 
terrible risks - that come with marketization of social relations, a great many people in 
China today are less dependent on the very contained local communities that 
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characterized Chinese social life in the recent past”48, it can equally be argued that 
top-down economic modernisation alone failed to solve persistent social problems 
such as income inequality, gender inequality, uneven regional development, and 
mass migration.49 Chan, Ngok and Phillips have pointed out that “economic benefits 
have not been equally shared by all citizens, and inequalities have widened between 
social classes, between rich and poor provinces and between urban and rural 
areas.”50 Economic modernisation has benefited a relatively small but growing middle 
class in China, which remains highly dependent on official patronage. According to 
Peter Hefele, “the main difference between the Western and Chinese concept of a 
middle class lies in the unique role played by party functionaries as a result of their 
having access to power and resources. Working in the state sector is seen as a key 
factor in becoming part of the middle class, and having a close relationship with the 
political elite can have a significant impact on financial success.”51  
This mirrors the development in imperial Germany where the emerging German 
bourgeoisie was unable to press for bottom-up reform and form a new political class. 
This can at least partly explain why widening inequalities and societal discontent so 
far has not posed a direct threat to the continued rule of the CPC. As Saich argues it 
is “clear that no coherent alternative vision has emerged that would fashion either a 
civil society or a rapid construction of a democratic political order.”52 At the same 
time, he points out that “from the party’s view, what is lurking in the shadows waiting 
to pounce on any opening that would allow freedom of expression is revivalism, 
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religion, linguistic division, regional and non-Han ethnic loyalties.53” Similar to 
Bismarck’s approach of ‘negative integration’, the CPC in post-Maoist China has 
continuously emphasized the dangers of greater pluralism, rather than accepting the 
latter as a necessary pre-condition for social and political liberalisation. As the 
German case showed such official intolerance is likely to lead to societal atomisation 
and fragmentation, thereby undermining bottom-up efforts to strengthen social 
cohesion through self-organisation and democratic self-government.    
Logic and limits of social management in maintaining stability 
The discussion so far has compared socio-political developments in the German 
Empire under Bismarck (1862-90) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during 
the Mao (1949-1976) and post-Mao period (1976-present). It revealed both 
similarities in the nature of political control and the effects of industrialisation and 
urbanisation on societal development in both countries. In the second part of this 
chapter I will discuss in more detail the logic and limits of China’s social management 
approach in maintaining stability in the late 20th and early 21st century. Reflecting on 
Bismarck’s failed approach to social and political stability in the 19th century in will 
draw conclusions in the third and final part.  
Political or social stability? 
Despite challenges to its legitimacy, the CPC has been governing China from 1949 
until the present day. According to Gunter Schubert it has achieved this feat not only 
by relying on economic development and nationalism but also by building legitimacy 
through incremental political reform, more specifically by gradually developing its 
ideology, adjusting its administrative structures and by enhancing the personal 
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authority of officials.54 Such ‘authoritarian resilience’ in the post-Mao period 
resembles Bismarck’s rule in the German Empire, which can be likened to an iron fist 
in a velvet glove. A key to the understanding why the CPC has been able to hold 
onto power is the understanding of stability among its political leadership.  
Duncan Freeman argues that “the quest for stability is arguably at the very centre of 
the Chinese concept of politics.”55 Drawing on speeches by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao 
and Jiang Zemin Freeman points out that “the statements from China’s leaders 
invoke the double connotation of stability, considered as political stability (stability of 
the state, the party and ultimately the Chinese nation) and social stability (stability of 
society in the wider sense, including law and order).”56 According to this logic, the 
stability of the political system and social stability are two sides of the same coin. 
Drawing on Jiang’s political thinking Freeman summarises the official position to 
mean that “stability is both a prerequisite for and a result of reform and 
development.”57 
This seemingly contradictory view is also mirrored in the CPC’s social management 
(shehui guanli) concept. While Chinese academic Yu Keping has interpreted its 
emergence to signify that “the Party and government have in fact already begun to 
see the existence and role of civil society as an important basis for decision 
making”58, Zhou Benshun, a secretary of the Party’s Central Politics and Law 
Commission warned that “some people have had two misunderstandings about 
social management overseas. The first is the idea of ‘small government ‒ large 
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society,’ that the bulk of social management should be taken on by society. In fact, 
not all developed nations follow this ‘small government ‒ large society’ model, and 
quite a number of large nations have large governments with the government taking 
on the principal tasks of social management. Second is the idea that social 
organizations are a ‘third sector,’ independent of the government and of the social 
management system. In fact, the vast majority of nongovernmental organizations 
overseas have government backgrounds, and all are under the effective 
management of the government. In our country, we must properly regulate conduct 
in fostering and developing social organizations, first putting ‘safety valves’ in place, 
thereby preventing the propagation of social organizations with ulterior motives.”59 
While Yu sees social management as a stepping stone towards inclusive social 
governance60 Zhou Benshun’s interpretation appears to be less benign. The official’s 
emphasis on ‘safety valves’ can also be interpreted to mean ‘stability preservation’ 
(wei wen). According to Qian Gang this political term gained currency in the second 
half of the Hu/Wen administration and can be understood as “a coded reference to 
social disorder — which is to say, social disorder must be avoided at all cost.”61 
Based on such an official understanding of stability, social harmony therefor is not 
only to be achieved by social policies alone but also with the help of a strong party-
state capable of initiating political campaigns and employing law enforcement 
agencies such as the notorious City Urban Administrative and Law Enforcement 
Bureaus (chengguan), police departments (gonganju), as well as the People’s Armed 
Police (renmin wuzhuang jingcha) in times of crisis.  
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The CPC’s two-pronged approach of influencing societal development with a 
combination of social services and increasingly heavy handed policing strategies62 
strongly resembles Bismarck’s approach of utilizing social legislation to appease the 
growing working classes’ demand for participation and representation, while at the 
same time employing the Anti-Socialist Law (Sozialistengesetz) to harass and 
persecute active members of the German Social Democratic Party. As our previous 
discussion revealed, Bismarck’s strategic approach only yielded short-term results 
and could not prevent the rise of the Social Democratic Party. The latter were 
repeatedly labelled as enemies of the state (Reichsfeinde), thereby creating 
resentment of the ancien regime among large swaths of the German working class. 
A similar development may also be taking place in post-Mao China, “where ethnic 
minority questions are especially often portrayed ... as a threat to national 
sovereignty, unity and stability.”63 
Logic and limits of building legitimacy through social policy 
Pitman Potter argues that the CPC has also been trying to “build legitimacy through 
social policy”.64 Reforms became necessary during the transition from the Maoist 
period, when social welfare was “an integral part of economic policy and planning, 
rather than a separate residual sector.”65 According to Sarah Cook “a major feature 
of the system was the division between the ‘iron rice bowl’ (and arm-chair) security 
provided to urban state workers (and officials) and much less generous programs of 
relief and social assistance for the remainder of the population - the minority of urban 
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residents who fell outside the work unit system, and the majority of the rural 
population.”66 This level of social welfare became unsustainable in the subsequent 
reform period.  
In the post-Maoist period “the government has been transferring back to society and 
family many welfare functions for which it previously had taken responsibility”.67 
Chan, Ngok and Phillips argue that slow economic restructuring and the dismantling 
of state-owned enterprises (SOE) during the 1990s “almost completely destroyed 
China’s socialist welfare system centred on the welfare activities of communes and 
state-owned enterprises”.68 Sarah Cook argues that “the government’s concern [was] 
with ‘perfecting’ the social security system, principally as a means to smooth the 
reform of the state enterprise sector, maintain social stability, and reduce the costs 
on the state.”69  
Social welfare reforms thus went hand in hand with the introduction of new social 
policies. The latter were designed to preempt societal challenges to economic 
policies by co-opting politically significant parts of the Chinese population. Whereas 
“urban workers received a wide range of social protections including old age 
insurance, medical insurance and discounts on the sale of public housing”70 Chan, 
Ngok and Phillips point out that “poorer families, especially those in rural areas, as 
well as migrant workers, received inadequate support with public assistance, 
housing, education and health.”71 Björn Gustafsson, Li Shi, and Terry Sicular have 
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argued that “concerns ... arise if segments of the population are left behind with 
insufficient resources to meet basic needs or entitlements”.72 
Reviewing the government’s efforts in the field of social security, labour, health, 
education and, housing policies Chan, Ngok and Phillips concluded that “China’s 
welfare reforms focused on the privatisation of public welfare and the localisation of 
welfare provisions that accelerated social divisions of welfare, threatening the equal 
value of citizens.”73 They go on to argue that “the development of social policy over 
the past three decades, revealed from market-oriented welfare provisions, the 
exclusion of migrant workers from basic needs, and the welfare gap between men 
and women, shows that China’s traditional socialist welfare values centred on 
equality and human needs have been severely suppressed.”74  
The picture that emerges from the discussion of social policies and social services as 
a key element in China’s social management approach both differs and resembles 
the situation in 19th century Germany. Whereas the challenge for the CPC in post-
Maoist China was “to reform and dismantle certain structures, thus reducing 
entitlements for some, while replacing and extending others”75 Bismarck’s social 
legislation in 19th century Germany created social safety nets where there had been 
none before. Bismarck’s concern was to reduce the dissatisfaction of the workers by 
insuring the life risks of sickness, accidents, disability, and old age.76 From 1883 until 
1889 he introduced health insurance, accident insurance, and old age pensions.77 
A co-author of Bismarck’s social legislation, Theodor Lohmann (1831-1905) 
described why Bismarck’s attempt to combine state repression with welfare 
ultimately failed. He mused that “the real social dissatisfaction is not simply a lack of 
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material conditions (...) but the desire for true equality before the law and the ability 
to participate in cultural affairs. Dissatisfied workers will only be satisfied if they have 
a feeling of genuine equality with the owning classes (e.g. in terms of the right to 
associations and the right to assembly) and by providing them with an orderly family 
life (regulation of the working hours for women, during nights, and on Sundays), 
thereby allowing them to gain access to a higher quality of life.”78 
Lohmann’s comment is illuminating insofar as it highlights the inherent limits of 
building legitimacy through social policy. Whereas Bismarck’s social policy can be 
described as too little, too, late the post-Maoist dismantling of the traditional welfare 
state and the accompanying privatisation could equally be described as too much, 
too soon. In both instances, the resulting welfare states were rudimentary at best, 
providing only limited safety nets for vulnerable groups. As the German case has 
shown, the strategic use of social policy as a means to uphold political stability thus 
was rather short-lived. If the Communist Party of China wants to avoid a similar 
demise as Bismarck’s ancien regime in the late 19th century its political strategists 
may need to go back to the policy drawing board. One possible first step for CPC 
decision-makers would be to acknowledge that economic reforms in China have 
brought about a multitude of new interest groups. In order to give Chinese citizens a 
better chance to articulate their various interests and defend and extend their 
particular values, the CPC should consider creating the legal-administrative 
framework conditions for Chinese civil society to participate in the policy process.  
Learning from Bismarck? 
This research paper raised the question to what extent the CPC’s current approach 
to social management can be explained with reference to Bismarck’s political 
statesmanship in the late 19th century. In order to address this question in the first 
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part I compared the political history in the German Empire under Bismarck (1862-90) 
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during the Mao (1949-1976) and post-
Mao period (1976-present). This historical comparison revealed a number of 
similarities as well as a few differences. Both Germany and China were late-comers 
to nation-building. Whereas the German Empire had the features of an authoritarian 
nation-state, the PRC developed from a totalistic state under Mao to a more 
paternalistic and authoritarian state under Deng Xiaoping. State-led industrialisation 
in Imperial Germany and the post-Maoist period in China revealed remarkable 
similarities. In both cases, commercial practices were introduced without adjusting 
the existing political institutions to the newly adopted models of capitalism. 
 
Social responses to state-led modernisation in Imperial Germany and China also 
exhibit some degree of similarity. In both cases the working class had to bear the 
brunt of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. Members of the emerging middle 
classes in both cases aimed to improve their economic situation and thus became 
dependent on the good will of the upper aristocratic class in the German Empire and 
government bureaucrats in the PRC respectively. Both political systems responded 
in similar ways to the increasing demands of a diversifying society. Bismarck 
employed manipulative strategies to focus the attention of Germans on perceived 
common enemies both home and abroad. Such political maneuvering yielded short 
term political gains during Reichstag elections, but also set a precedence of official 
intolerance towards minorities. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the case of 
China, where the fear of religion, linguistic division, and ethnic conflict has led to the 
blanket curtailment of freedom of expression.    
 
In the second part I discussed in more detail the logic and limits of China’s social 
management approach in maintaining stability in the late 20th and early 21st century. 
The discussion revealed that leading proponents of the CPC regard the stability of 
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the political system and social stability as two sides of the same coin. Social 
management has either been understood to signify an opportunity for the inclusion of 
non-state actors into the development process or as a call to arms for an empowered 
bureaucracy to actively intervene in societal development. Upon closer inspection it 
became evident that the CPC’s approach to social management combines social 
policies with increasingly heavy handed policing strategies.  
 
The subsequent discussion centered around the question to which degree the CPC 
has been able to build legitimacy through social policy. While social policies have so 
far been successful to co-opt politically significant parts of the Chinese population, 
the preferential treatment of urban workers over rural Chinese and migrant workers 
also raise serious questions about social, political and economic justice in China. 
According to a study conducted by Göbel and Ong “[social] unrest in China has been 
increasing at an alarming rate. Few incidents of public demonstrations, disruptive 
action or riots occured in the 1980s, but 8,700 ‘mass incidents’ were recorded in 
1993 alone. By 2005, their number had grown tenfold to 87,000, and estimates for 
the number of public protests in 2010 range between 180,000 and 230,000.”79 The 
costs for maintaining social order through domestic policing has also dramatically 
increased. According to a study conducted by Tsinghua University, the budget for 
internal security in 2010 surpassed China’s spending on national defense.80 Such 
developments suggest that the CPC’s current social management approach to 
maintaining stability is not sustainable. One of the historical lessons from Bismarck’s 
approach to social and political stability is that his repression of societal demands 
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was ultimately unsuccessful. So what could be done by the CPC to escape the 
political predicament of the German Empire, which imploded in 1918?   
 
While none of the Chinese political leaders in the post-Maoist era have attained the 
historical status of Otto von Bismarck, it can be argued that the CPC as a Leninist 
party is already playing by his playbook. Preempting societal demands for political 
reform by establishing a rudimentary form of a Chinese welfare state has helped 
enhance the party-state’s legitimacy. China’s current political leaders should however 
not be too self-congratulatory and simply assume that their social management 
approach will also work in the future. Bismarck ultimately failed to win over the hearts 
and minds of German workers. I argued that he failed due to the limited scope and 
ambition of his social legislation. He also failed to develop the political institutions of 
the German Empire to meet the needs of a diversifying society. 
 
In conclusion I argue that a deepening of social policies in China would not only 
contribute to enhanced social safety nets but also help lay the foundation for state-
led reconciliation of interests between different parties. The Xi Jinping Administration 
can also learn another historical lesson from Imperial Germany. It is in its 
organisational self-interest to gradually open up the political process for non-state 
actors and to become more inclusive. Such a reform strategy would allow the Xi 
Administration to continue steering China’s transition, albeit with the help of civil 
society actors and greater public participation.  
 
In 2012 Chinese academic Yu Jianrong put forward a ten-year plan for social and 
political reforms which provides details how such a political opening could be 
achieved. In a first reform phase from October 2012 until December 2015 he 
suggests that China’s new political leadership should “(achieve) basic social equality 
and justice, with the adjustment of public welfare policies as the premise and the 
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protection of people’s rights as the foundation”.81 During a second phase from 
January 2016 to September 2022 he suggests that the Xi Administration in its 
second terms should “(promote) the transition of the country to constitutional 
democracy, with political reform as the premise and civil rights as the foundation”.82 
As I have argued before “Yu’s plan is the most notable reform agenda to emerge 
since the Charter 08”83 and “signifies a willingness among party-state officials to 
engage in open-ended discussions about democracy and human rights in China”. Yu 
has been “working within the system to advocate incremental political reform and is 
frequently invited to lecture officials at training seminars funded by the Communist 
Party.”84  
 
The “Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms” 
published by the CPC on 15 November 2013 in the wake of the Third Plenum of the 
18th CPC Congress suggests that Yu’s message is not entirely falling on deaf ears. 
While some commentators have lauded the document as evidence that “the 
Communist Party has indeed produced its most wide-ranging and reform-tinged 
proposals for economic and social change in many years”85 there seems to be a 
great deal of continuation of the former social management approach under Xi 
Jinping. As Alice Miller has pointed out, nine of the sixty reform proposals address 
“social services and ‘social management’ reform”.86 Miller has furthermore argued 
that the goal of China’s new Central State Security Committee, another outcome of 
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the Third Plenum, is to “improve national security strategy and its work mechanism to 
keep high vigilance against and resolutely forestall activities of separatism, infiltration 
and subversion carried out by hostile forces to ensure national security.”87 Such 
continued emphasis on a few social policy carrots and a big political control stick 
does not bode well for China’s future. If the CPC wanted to avoid the predicament of 
Bismarck’s ancien regime and if the new Xi Administration was to adopt Yu 
Jianrong’s ten-year plan for social and political reforms, either wholesale or in part, it 
may once again prove naysayers wrong and continue to steer China’s political future.  
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